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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING: THE EXPANDING
HORIZONS OF PERMISSIBLE CONDUCT
Philip Q. Zauderer, an attorney practicing law in Ohio,
advertised in local newspapers in an effort to generate more
business.' Zauderer placed an advertisement in thirty-six Ohio
newspapers in the spring of 1982.2 The advertisement informed the
public of Zauderer's willingness to represent women who had
suffered personal injuries from the use of a contraceptive known as
the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD). 3 The advertisement
contained an illustration of the Dalkon Shield and posed the
question, "DID YOU USE THIS IUD? ' ' 4 The advertisement
explained that Zauderer's law firm was litigating a number of
1. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2271 (1985). Zauderer ran two
separate advertisements, one addressing drunken driving, the other addressing Dalkon Shield
injuries. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. In addition to the Dalkon Shield advertisement, Zauderer ran an advertisement which
advised readers that his law office would represent defendants in drunk driving cases. Id. The
advertisement stated that if Zauderer's clients were convicted of "DRUNK DRIVING," Zauderer
wtuld refund their full legal fee. Id. (emphasis in original). Zauderer immediately withdrew the
advertisement upon notification by the Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio that the
advertisement violated disciplinary rule 2-106(C) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.
Id. Disciplinary rule 2-106(C) prohibits an attorney from offering to represent a client in a criminal
action on a contingent fee basis. OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONAlt RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C)(1986).
4. 105 S. Ct. at 2271 (emphasis in original). The advertisement published by Zauderer stated as
follows:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sicl Device is alleged to have caused serious pelvic
infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility and hysterectomies. It
is also alleged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions,
miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-term deliveries.
Ifyou or a friend have had a similar experience do not assume it is too late to take legal
action against the Shield's manufacturer.
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lawsuits against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield and that all
such lawsuits were handled on a contingent fee basis. 5 The
advertisement stated that, "[ilf there is no recovery, no legal fees
are owed by our clients." 6 Zauderer's advertisement generated 106
lawsuits against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield. 7
Zauderer's advertisement prompted the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio to file a complaint against
Zauderer.8 The complaint alleged that Zauderer, by employing the
Dalkon Shield advertisement, had violated certain disciplinary
rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. 9 The
complaint alleged that Zauderer: (1) used an unauthorized
illustration in his advertisement; 10 (2) recommended himself for
5. Id. at 2272.
6. Id.
7. Id. As a result of the advertisement, Zauderer was contacted by over 200 potential litigants.
Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2272-73. In addition to charges based on the Dalkon Shield advertisements, the
complaint charged that Zauderer violated disciplinary rule 2-101(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility by publishing a drunken driving advertisement. Id. Disciplinary rule 2-101(A) of the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility specified as follows: "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of
himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use, or participate
in the use of, any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAi RESPONSIBIrITY
DR 2-101(A) (1982) (amended 1986). The Disciplinary Counsel contended that the drunken driving
advertisement was misleading because in it Zauderer offered to represent defendants in criminal
actions on a contingent fee basis - a proposition that could not be carried out in conformity with
Ohio disciplinary rule 2-106(C). 105 S. Ct. at 2272.
10. 105 S. Ct. at 2272. At the time of the Zauderer case, disciplinary rule 2-101(B) of the Ohio
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibited the use of illustrations in attorney advertisements,
and limited the information that could be included in an advertisement. The rule provided as
follows:
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103,
in print media or over radio or television. Print media includes only regularly
published newspapers, magazines and other periodicals, classified telephone
directories, city, county and suburban directories, law directories and law lists. The
information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication or broadcast shall comply with
DR 2-101(A) [see supra note 71 and be presented in a dignified manner without the use of
drawin.:'s, illustrations, animations, portrayals, dramatizations, sloans, music, lyrics or the use qf
pictures, except for the use of pictures of the advertising lawyer, or the use of a portrayal
of the scales of justice. Only the following information may be published or broadcast:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates,
addresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm is available to
practice, but may not include a statement that the practice is limited to or
concentrated in one or more fields of law or that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a
particular field of law unless authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Age;
(4) Date of admission to the bar of a state, or federal court or administrative
board or agency;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service:
(8) Published legal authorships;
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employment to persons who had not sought his advice;" (3)
accepted employment from persons he had advised to obtain legal
counsel; 12 and (4) deceived the public with respect to the
computation of the contingent fee rate. 13
A panel of the Ohio Supreme Court's Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline determined that the advertisement
violated Ohio's Disciplinary Rules.' 4 The panel recommended to
(9) Holding scientific, technical and professional licenses, and memberships in
such associations or societies;
(10) Foreign language ability;
(11) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(12) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(13) Fee for an initial consultation;
(14) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for specific services;
(15) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C) [see supra note 31, provided that
the statement discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of
court costs and expenses;
(16) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fce charged
will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the particular matter
to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate
of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used
in setting forth the fee information;
(17) Fixed fees for specific legal services;
(18) Legal teaching positions, memberships, offices, committee assignments, and
section memberships in bar associations;
(19) Memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(20) In law directories and law lists only, names and addresses of references and,
with their written consent, names of clients regularly represented.
011o ConE OF PRoFEssIoNAl. REsPoNsnBnn.urv DR 2-101(B) (1982) (amended 1986) (emphasis
added).
11. 105 S. Ct. at 2272-73. Disciplinary rule 2-103(A) of the Ohio Code of Proflessional
Responsibility prohibits an attorney from "recommendlingI employment, as a private practitioner,
of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who had not sought his advice regarding
evnployment of a lawyer." OHno Cone OF PRoFessnoNAj. RESPONStIBr' DR 2-103(A)(1986).
12. 105 S. Ct. at 2273. Disciplinary rule 2-104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
o)btain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice." 0141
Cone oF ProFeSSONAI. RESPONStBnt.ITy DR 2-104(A) (1986).
13. 105 S. Ct. at 2273. Disciplinary rule 2-101(B)(15) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility stated that an advertisement that mentions contingent fee rates must disclose
"whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses." Onto
ConE OF PROFESSI NAi. RESPONSIBI.ITY DR 2-101(B)(15) (1982) (repealed 1986). For the text of
disciplinary rule 2-101(B)(15), see supra note 10. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio contended that Zauderer's failure to disclose that clients may be liable for costs, even if
there was no recovery, was "deceptive" under disciplinary rule 2-101(A). 105 S. Ct. at 2281. For the
text of disciplinary rule 2-101(A), see supra note 9.
14. 105 S. Ct. 2273. In addition to finding that the Dalkon Shield advertisement violated the
disciplinary rules, the panel also determined that a drunken driving advertisement published by
Zauderer was deceptive. Id. For a discussion of the drunken driving advertisement, see supra notes 3
and 9. The panel concluded that the advertisement's failure to discuss the possibility of a plea
bargain might deceive clients who do not realize that a plea of guilty to a lesser charge constitutes a
conviction, but not a drunk driving conviction. Id. Hence, the client could be liable for Zauderer's
fi'es because Zauderer's advertisement stated that legal. fees would be refunded only if the client was
convicted of drunk driving. See id. For the text of Zauderer's drunk driving advertisement, see supra
note 3.
The panel relected Zauderer's argument that Ohio's disciplinary rules restricting the content of
attorney advertisements were unconstitutional. Id. at 2274. Thus, the panel found him in violation of
these rules. Id. at 2273-74. For the texts of the disciplinary rules that Zauderer violated, see supra
notes 9-13.
578 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:559
the Board of Commissioners that Zauderer receive a public
reprimand.15 Although the Board adopted the panel's findings, it
recommended that the Supreme Court of Ohio indefinitely suspend
Zauderer from the practice of law.' 6 The Supreme Court of Ohio
agreed with the Board's finding that Zauderer had violated Ohio's
Disciplinary Rules, but determined that only a public reprimand
was justified.1 7 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in part,' 8 and held that the state
could not discipline Zauderer for soliciting business through
advertisements containing nondeceptive illustrations and
information regarding the legal rights of potential clients. ' 9 Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to freedom of speech. 20 The court in Zauderer
determined that the advertisement at issue fell within the category
of commercial speech. 21 Although the United States Supreme
15. Id. at 2273-74.
16. Id. at 2274.
17. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, -_, 461 N.E.2d 883, 887
(1984), modified, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). Zauderer was the first Ohio case to address the constitutional
validity of disciplinary rules that limit the content of legal service advertisements. Id. at -, 461
N.F.2d at 885. The Supreme Court of Ohio noted that the United States Supreme Court had
recognized a state's ability to regulate communications that are not misleading. Id. at __ , 461
N.F.2d at 886; see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). Before a state may regulate information
that is not misleading, however, it must assert a substantial interest that justifies the regulation.
Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d at - , 461 N.E.2d at 886. Moreover, the scope of the restriction must be
proportional to the state's substantial interest. Id. Following these guidelines, the Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that Ohio's disciplinary rules furthered substantial state interests, apparently
related to protecting potential clients. See id. Thus, the rules passed constitutional muster. Id.
The court determined that, by publishing the Dalkon Shield advertisement and the drunk
driving advertisement, Zauderer had violated five disciplinary rules of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility. Id. at 886, 887. For the texts of these rules, see supra notes 9-13. The court
recognized, however, that although Zauderer's drunken driving advertisement was deceptive, he
withdrew it immediately upon notification from the Disciplinary Counsel and accepted no
employment generated by the advertisement. Id. at __ , 461 N.E.2d at 887. Thus, the court
determined that a public reprimand, rather than suspension, was appropriate. Id.
18. 105 S. Ct. at 2284. The United States Supreme court affirmed the public reprimand of
Zauderer. Id. The affirmation was based on deficiencies in two of Zauderer's advertisements. Id.
One failed to clearly explain the handling of drunken driving cases, and the other, the Dalkon Shield
advertisement, omitted information concerning contingent fee arrangements. Id. For a discussion of
these deficiencies in Zauderer's advertisements, see supra notes 13-14. The Court concluded that the
)alkon Shield advertisement was deceptive because it failed to state that clients may be liable for
court costs even if their lawsuits were unsuccessful. 105 S. Ct. at 2283. The Supreme Court,
however, concluded that Zauderer should not be punished for his alleged violation of Ohio
disciplinary rules 2-101(B), 2-103(A), and 2-104(A). Id. at 2284. For the texts of these rules, see supra
notes 10-12.
19. Id. at 2280, 2281. The Court found that the illustration and offerof legal advice contained in
the ilhlkon Shield advertisement were truthful and accurate, and that an absolute prohibition on
advertising did not advance a substantial state interest. Id. at 2277.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides as
follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
21. 105 S. Ct. at 2275. The Court noted that "speech proposing a commercial transaction" is
generally categorized as commercial speech. See id. The Court determined that the speech at issue in
Zauderer was "advertising pure and simple," designed to propose a commercial transaction. Id.
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Court has stated that the first amendment affords less protection for
commercial speech than for noncommercial speech, 22 the Court has
also determined that commercial speech is not outside first
amendment protection. 23
The United States Supreme Court has established a four
prong test to determine the constitutionality of governmental
restrictions on commercial speech. This test was applied in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. 24 First, a
court must determine whether the expression is entitled to first
amendment protection. 25 Commercial speech is entitled to first
amendment protection if it concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading.26 If the commercial speech is entitled to first
amendment protection, a court must determine whether the
restriction is supported by a substantial governmental interest. 27
Third, if the answer to the first two inquiries is yes, a court must
determine whether the restriction "directly advances" the asserted
governmental interest. 28 Finally, a court must determine whether
22. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64- 65 (1983); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
23. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy the plaintiff, a consumer group, challenged a state statute which
provided that it is unprofessional for a pharmacist to advertise his prescription drug prices. Id. at
752. The state's interest in prohibiting price advertising was the maintenance of a "high degree of
professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists." Id. at 766. The State argued that such
advertisements could cause price competition, which could ultimately deteriorate the pharmacist's
status to that of a "mere retailer." Id. at 768. The Court, however, concluded that the first
amendment protected the commercial speech contained in pharmacists' advertisements. See id. at
762, 773. The Court based its decision on the informational value commercial speech supplies to
consumers. Id. at 763-64. The Court noted that consumers, especially the elderly, have a compelling
interest in knowing the prices various pharmacists charge for prescriptions. Id.
24. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The dispute in Central Hudson arose when the New York Public Service
Commission, in an effort to conserve energy, prohibited all electric companies from promotional
advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558-59
(1980). The State contended that the public would consume more electric power if companies were
allowed to advertise. See id. at 559. Central Hudson Gas and Electric Company challenged the
advertising ban as a restraint on commercial speech. See id. at 560. The United States Supreme
Court determined that promotional advertisements are protected by the first amendment, and that
the Public Service Commission's regulation failed to meet the test for governmental regulation of
commercial speech. Id. at 561, 572.
25. Id. at 566.
26. Id. The first amendment does not protect speech that is misleading or proposes an illegal
activity, and states are free to regulate such speech. Id. at 563-64; see, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) (upholding a ban on sex
designated advertisements because those ads would promote illegal employment). The Supreme
Court has held that state may prohibit commercial speech that merely has the potential to mislead.
See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (upholding a ban on the use of trade namis
because these advertisements may mislead the public). In Central Hudson the Public Service
Cot..ission did not allege that Central Hudson's advertisement was misleading or proposed an
illegal activity. 447 U.S. at 566. Thus, Central Hudson's advertisement was clearly within first
amendment protection. Id. at 568.
27. 447 U.S. at 564. The state's interests in Central Hudson were energy conservation and
maintenance of a stable rate structure. Id. at 568. The Court concluded that both interests were
substantial. Id. at 568-69.
28. Id. at 564. A regulation will be struck down if it only remotely supports the governmental
interest asserted. Id. The Court ruled that only the state's interest in energy conservation was
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the restriction is more extensive than necessary to serve the
governmental interest.29
Before the United States Supreme Court established the
Central Hudson test, however, it decided Bates v. State Bar. 30 In Bates
two attorneys practicing law in Arizona published a newspaper
advertisement that listed the fees they charged for performing
routine legal services.31 The Arizona State Bar brought an action
against the attorneys claiming that their advertisement violated a
disciplinary rule of the Supreme Court of Arizona that prohibited
lawyers from publicizing. their business through commercial
means.3 2 The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the attorneys'
claim that the disciplinary rule violated their first amendment
rights, and ordered that the lawyers be censured.3 3 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court decided that allowing consumers to
obtain some information through advertisements is better than
denying them access to all information.3 4 The alternative, the
directly advanced by the regulation prohibiting advertising. Id. at 569. The Court concluded that
Central Hudson's advertisement would result in increased energy consumption. Id. Any connection,
however, between the regulation and the state's interest in rate structures was too speculative to
warrant suppression of the advertisements. Id.
29. Id. at 569-70. The regulation in Central Hudson prohibited all forms of promotional
advertising. Id. at 570. The Court concluded that the state's interest in energy conservation did not
entitle it to prohibit advertisement of energy efficient devices. Id. Therefore, because the regulation
was unnecessarily broad, it was declared unconstitutional. Id.
30. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
31. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 354 (1977). The two attorneys in Bates opened a legal clinic
to provide routine legal services to persons of moderate income who were not entitled to legal aid. Id.
These services included uncontested divorces, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name.
Id. These services were chosen because the attorneys could offer them and yet keep costs down by
using automatic typewriting equipment and paralegals. Id. The attorneys felt that, because of the
routine nature of their services, the only way they could keep their practice alive was to list their
prices for those services. Id.
32. Id. at 355. Both attorneys agreed that their advertisement violated disciplinary rule 2-101(B)
of the Arizona Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. At the time of trial, the rule specified, in
pertinent part, as follows:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city
or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize
or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id.; see ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1976) (adopting the A.B.A. Model Code); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaILrv DR 2-101(B) (1976) (amended 1977). The attorneys, however,
contended that the disciplinary rule violated their constitutional right to freedom of speech. 433 U.S.
at 356-57; see U.S. CONST. amend. I. For the text of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution, see supra note 20. The State Bar Board argued that allowing attorneys to advertise
prices charged for services would deteriorate the reputable status of the legal profession. 433 U.S. at
368.
33. 433 U.S. at 357-58.
34. Id. at 374. The Court in Bates, like the Court in Virginia Pharmacy, emphasized society's
interest in the free, flow of information. Id. at 364. For a discussion of Virginia Pharmacy, see supra note
23. Commercial speech allows consumers to make an informed decision concerning what product or
service to purchase. 433 U.S. at 364.
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Court noted, would be to ban attorney advertising. 35 In response to
the argument that advertisements may provide incomplete
information, the Court stated that, rather than allow disciplinary
rules to restrict the free flow of information, the preferred remedy is
to require more disclosure in attorney advertisements. 36 However,
the Court in Bates concluded that advertising which is false,
deceptive, or misleading is not entitled to first amendment
protection and is subject to restraint."
The United States Supreme Court has addressed attorney
solicitation of clients in a number of cases. The first case, which
dealt with group solicitation, was NAACP v. Button.38 The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
brought suit against the State of Virginia, asserting that a Virginia
statute violated the first amendment. 39 The statute made it a crime
to advise another that his or her legal rights had been violated and
then refer him or her to an attorney or group of attorneys, such as
the NAACP. 40 The NAACP's activities are aimed at eliminating
racial barriers and advancing the rights of Negro citizens, often
through litigation. 41 The Court determined that, because the goals
of the NAACP were political, rather than private, the
organization's activities constituted "political expression.' 42 Thus,
the NAACP's activities, including the solicitation of potential
35. 433 U.S. at 374. The Court stated that a ban on attorney advertising is premised on the
assumption that the public is unable to comprehend the gravity of an advertisement. Id. at 374-75.
The Court stated that this argument "rests on an underestimation of the public." Id. at 375.
36. Id. The Court based its decision to allow attorney advertising on the vital role
advertisements play in consumer transactions. Id. at 364. From the information contained in an
advertisement, the public can determine how to meet its needs. Id. The Court also noted that
banning advertising by attorneys will not prevent attorneys from rendering low quality services. Id.
at 378.
37. Id. at 383; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (untruthful speech and deceptive or misleading commercial speech
are not protected by the first amendment). The sole issue addressed by the Court in Bates was
whether attorneys should be able to advertise prices charged for routine legal services. 433 U.S. at
367-68. The Court noted that routine legal services are probably the only services that attorneys can
advertise. Id. at 372. This is due to the element of uncertainty attorneys face in many of the services
they provide. Id. But this uncertainty does not render all advertising misleading. Id. Based on this
analysis, the Court held that states can place some restrictions on attorney advertisements, but not a
blanket prohibition. Id. at 383.
38. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
39. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 418 (1963).
40. Id. at 423 & n.7; see VA. CODE ANN. S 54-74, -78, -79, -82 (1958) (amended 1964).
41. 371 U.S. at 419. At the time of the Button case, the NAACP focused most of its litigation
toward ending racial segregation in public schools. Id. at 420. The lawyers who worked with the
NAACP were organized and paid by that organization. Id. at 433-34.
42. Id. at 428-29. The Court stated as follows:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by
all government, federal, state, and local, for the members of the Negro community in
this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves
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clients, were entitled to first amendment protection.43 Accordingly,
the State was required to show a compelling interest that justified
prohibiting group solicitation by the NAACP.4 4 The State failed in
its burden, and the statute was declared unconstitutional as applied
to the NAACP. 45
In the subsequent case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 4 6
the United States Supreme Court addressed in-person solicitation.
The dispute in Ohralik arose when an attorney sought employment
by personally contacting two teenage women involved in an
automobile accident. 47  Both women agreed to have Ohralik
represent them, but later changed their minds.4 8  Ohralik was
charged with violating Ohio disciplinary rules that prohibit self-
recommendation when giving unsolicited legal advice. 49  The
Supreme Court of Ohio found Ohralik in violation of the rules and
stated that Ohralik's conduct was not constitutionally protected.5 0
On appeal, the Court upheld the Supreme Court of Ohio's
decision to suspend Ohralik from the practice of law, stating that
in-person solicitation is not entitled to the same first amendment
protection as are other types of commercial advertisements. 51 The
difference in the degree of protection afforded the two means of
unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts....
And under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole
practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 429-30.
43. Id. at 421,428-29.
44. Id. at 439. The Court stated that "[because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in this area only with narrow specificity." Id. at 433. The
Court in Button required that the State show a "compelling state interest" in the regulation of
political expression. Id. at 429, 439. In cases involving purely commercial speech, however, the
government is required to show only that the regulation promotes a "substantial interest." Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
45. 371 U.S. at 444.
46. 436 U.S. 447, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
47. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449-50, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
The women solicited by Ohralik were still recuperating when contacted. Id. at 450. One of the
women was in traction in the hospital, and the other had just been released from the hospital. Id.
48. Id. at 450-51. One of the women signed a written contract of representation and the other
replied "O.K." when Ohralik spoke to her about representation. Id. Both women later attempted to
repudiate their representation agreements. Id. at 452. When Ohralik refused to release them from
the contracts, the women filed complaints with the grievance committee of the county bar. Id. at 452.
49. Id. at 453 & n.9. Ohralik was charged with violating disciplinary rules 2-103(A) and 2-
104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 453. For the text of DR 2-103(A), see
supra note 11. For the text of DR 2-104(A), see supra note 12.
50. 436 U.S. at 453.
51. See id. at 455. Ohralik argued that his solicitation of the accident victims was constitutionally
protected because it was essentially the same as the advertisement in Bates. Id. at 455; see Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977) (lawyers' newspaper advertisement was protected under first
amendment). Therefore, Ohralik contended that his conduct should not be restricted. Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 455. The Court in Bates, however, did not address in-person solicitation, and merely
extended first amendment protection to advertisements that listed the prices charged for routine legal
services. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-68, 382. For a discussion of Bates, see supra notes 30-37 and
accompanying text.
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advertising stems from the fact that in-person solicitation may exert
undue pressure on a prospective client and often requires an
immediate response. 52 In contrast to a public advertisement, which
allows the reader a choice of whether or not to react to the
advertisement, personal solicitations have the potential to induce
fraud, unduly influence, and intimidate.53 Thus, the State's
compelling interest in protecting clients justified the prohibition of
personal solicitations. 54
In In re PriMus, 55 another case discussing attorney solicitation,
the United States Supreme Court determined that the first
amendment protects solicitations that provide a means of
furthering political and ideological goals.5 6 Primus, a lawyer
working with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), sent a
letter to a woman who was sterilized as a condition to her receipt of
Medicaid assistance. 57 The letter stated that the ACLU would
represent the woman if she wished to initiate an action based on the
injuries she had sustained. 58 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
ordered that Primus receive a public reprimand for engaging in
an unethical solicitation in violation of state disciplinary rules.5 9
The United States Supreme Court noted in Primus that the
nonprofit activities of the ACLU were analogous to the activities of
52. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. Personal solicitation does not allow the recipient time to make an
informed decision. Id. The Court also noted that, unlike the newspaper advertisements in Bates, in-
person solicitation is not subject to public scrutiny. Id. at 466.
53. Id. at 457. The evils connected with personal solicitation include: "[s]tirring up litigation,
assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential harm to the solicited client
in the form of overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation." Id. at 461.
The Court noted that a lawyer who personally solicits a client may place his own pecuniary interests
above the interests of his client. Id. at 461 n.19. An uninvited attorney may also violate an
individual's right to privacy, Id. at 465.
54. Id. at 462, 467. In addition to concerns about fraudulent practices, the state has an interest
in prohibiting personal solicitations in order to maintain the standards of the professional
community. Id. at 460; see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (stating that
"[tihe interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the
primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the
court' ").
55. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
56. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978). In Button the Court had extended constitutional
protection to political speech used as a means of ending racial barriers. For a discussion of Button, see
supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
57. 436 U.S. at 415-16.
58. Id. at 416 n.6. The ACLU was willing to represent the woman at no cost. See id. at 4.16. The
only compensation Primus would receive as a result of the work performed for the ACLU was a
retainer as a legal consultant. Id. at 415. After learning of this letter, the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina filed a complaint against Primus.
Id. at 417. The complaint alleged that Primus had engaged in unethical conduct by soliciting legal
service through the mail. Id. Primus contended that her conduct was protected by the first
amendment. Id.
59. Id. at 418-21. The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that Primus violated two of
its disciplinary rules. Id. at 420-21. Disciplinary rule 2-103(D) prohibited self-promotion through an
"organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services." Id. at 418 n. 10. Disciplinary
rule 2-104(A) prohibited a lawyer from accepting employment after giving unsolicited legal advice.
Id. at 420 n.l 1.
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the NAACP in Button.60 Because Primus' goal was primarily
political expression, rather than financial gain, her communication
to potential litigants fell within the first amendment's protection for
associational freedom. 61 In addition, the Court noted that, unlike
personal solicitation, Primus' letter resulted in no invasion of
privacy or opportunity for coercion by the attorney. 62 Thus, the
State's interest in protecting clients was not served by the
application of the disciplinary rules to Primus. 63
The Court in Primus noted two distinctions between the
expression used in Primus, which was constitutionally protected,
and that used in Ohralik, which was subject to prohibition by the
state. 64  First, the Court noted that Primus conducted her
solicitation by mail, but Ohralik had personally solicited his
clients. 65 Second, the Court recognized that Primus' solicitation
was politically motivated, but the sole purpose for Ohralik's
solicitation was pecuniary gain. 66
In a later case, In re R.M.J.,67 the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of disciplinary rules that placed restrictions on
60. See id. at 427. The Court stated that, like the NAACP, the ACLU is primarily a civil liberties
organization that uses litigation as a means of achieving its political and societal objectives. Id. at
427. The Court also noted that both the ACLU and the NAACP appeared to .'[engage] in extensive
educational and lobbying activities' and 'also [devote] much of [their] funds and energies to an
extensive program of assisting certain kinds of litigation on behalf of [their] declared purposes."' Id.
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1963) (bracketed material inserted by Court).
For a discussion of Button, see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. Thus, neither organization
was motivated primarily by monetary gain. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431.
61. 436 U.S. at 431. The Court determined that "'collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment."' Id. at 426 (quoting United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576-585
(1971)). The Court compared commercial speech with political speech and stated that "[i]n the
context of political expression and association . . . a State must regulate with significantly greater
precision.'" 436 U.S. at 437-38.
62. 436 U.S. at 435. In addition to finding no privacy or coercion problems, the Court also
stated that Primus' letter was not misleading. Id. In fact, Primus had offered to explain the nature of
the proceedings to the client. Id.
63. See id. at 439.
64. Id. at 422. Primus' expression consisted of informing a woman by letter that the ACLU was
willing to represent her in an action against her wrongdoer. Id. at 416. Ohralik, on the other hand,
personally visited two accident victims and offered to represent them in actions against the insurance
company. SeeOhralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 450-51 (1978). For a discussion of Ohralik, see
supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
65. Primus, 436 U.S. at 422. Because Primus' communication was by letter, many problems
inherent with in-person solicitation, such as invasion of privacy and over-reaching or coercion by the
attorney, were not present. Id. at 435. Further, written methods of solicitation are easier to supervise
than are in-person solicitations, reducing the need for prophylactic regulations. Id. at 435-36. For the
definition of a prophylactic regulation, see infra note 79.
66. Primus, 436 U.S. at 422. The motive behind each attorney's solicitation affected the degree
of judicial scrutiny applied in each case. Primus' "political expression" was given a high degree of
first amendment protection. See id. at 438 n.32. Ohralik's advertisement was viewed as commercial
speech, and therefore accorded a lesser degree of constitutional protection. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-
57.
67. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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the content of attorney advertisements. 68 In order to announce the
opening of his law practice, R.M.J. published advertisements
which contained information other than that allowed by the
disciplinary rules. 69 As a result of these advertisements, he was
charged with unprofessional conduct and was issued a private
reprimand by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 7 0 The United States
Supreme Court determined that, not only did the State fail to show
that the advertisements were misleading, but the State also failed to
assert that the restrictions promoted a substantial governmental
interest.71  Absent a showing that the advertisements were
misleading, or that the regulation promoted a substantial state
interest, the Court held that the restriction infringed on R.M.J.'s
first amendment rights.
72
68. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 193-96 (1982). Missouri disciplinary rule 2-101 contained a list
of 10 items of information that a lawyer may state in his or her advertisement. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4,
DR 2-101(B) (1978) (current version at Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, Rule 7.2 (1987). The categories listed
were: Name, address, and telephone number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools
attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability of a
schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for certain specified "routine"
legal services. Id. An addendum was issued to the Code specifying two ways in which attorneys could
list their areas of practice. Mo. -Sup. CT. R. 4, addendum III (1977). First, attorneys could specify
one of three general areas: "General Civil Practice," "General Criminal Practice," or "General
Civil and Criminal Practice." Id. Alternatively, attorneys could choose from a list of23 specific areas
of practice. Id. The rule also permitted attorneys to send out announcement cards, but only to
"lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." Mo. SUp. CT. R. 4, DR 2-
102(A)(2) (1978). Disciplinary rule 2-101 did not expressly state that advertisements were limited to
the 10 categories of information specified, but that was the interpretation given to the rules by both
the Missouri Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee. 455 U.S. at 194.
69. 455 U.S. at 196-97.
70. Id. at 197-98. R.M.J. was charged with four different violations. Id. at 198. R.M.J. listed
areas of practice not provided for in the addendum to the code; for example, he listed "personal
injury" and "real estate" instead of "tort law" and "property law." Id. at 197. R.M.J. also listed
courts in which he had been admitted to practice, information which was not authorized under
disciplinary rule 2-101(B). Id. Furthermore, R.M.J. sent announcements to individuals other than
those provided for in disciplinary rule 2-102(A)(2). Id. at 198. Finally, R.M.J. failed to include a
disclaimer of expertise in the areas of practice listed, in violation of the addendum rule. Id. at 195,
197. The Supreme Court of Missouri expressed no rationale for its issuance of a private reprimand.
Id. at 198. The court failed to state whether R.M.J. had committed all or some of the violations with
which he was charged. See id.
71. 455 U.S. at 205. Recent cases have stated that when an advertisement is inherently
misleading, it can be regulated. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (certain
types of attorney advertisements may be misleading and may warrant restriction). The Court in
R.M... noted that the public's lack of knowledge, the inability of attorneys to supervise themselves,
and the lack of any standardization in the "product," present possibilities of deception in attorney
advertising. 455 U.S. at 202. The Court noted, however, that listing "real estate" as an area of
practice, instead of "property," the category specified by the disciplinary rule, is hardly misleading.
Id. at 205. The Court also found that the advertisement's statement that R.M.J. was licensed
to practice in Illinois and Missouri was not misleading. Id. The Court viewed this as "highly relevant
information" to a consumer. See id. The Court determined that the advertisement's statement that
R.M..T. was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States was in poor taste, but
was not misleading. Id. at 205-06. The Court concluded that R.M.J.'s advertisement was not
misleaditg, and therefore could be restricted only to further a substantial state interest. Id. at 207.
No substantial interest was asserted in support of the rule. Id. at 205-06.
72. 455 U.S. at 207. Regarding R.M.J.'s mailing of announcement cards to persons other than
those listed in disciplinary rule 2-101(A)(2), the Court noted that the State had failed to articulate a
substantial interest that justifed restricting the mailings to certain people. Id. at 206. For the text of
rule 2-101(A)(2), see supra note 68. Even assuming that the restrictions were based on the difficulty of
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Zauderer's solicitation of Dalkon Shield litigants presented yet
another attorney advertising case to the United States Supreme
Court. The Court noted that the substantial state interests that
justified a ban on in-person solicitation in Ohralik were not present
in Zauderer.7 3 Unlike in-person solicitation, which tends to put
pressure on a client for an immediate answer, printed
advertisements allow the reader time to consider the information
contained in the advertisement and then to make a knowledgeable
decision. 4
The Court also rejected Ohio's argument that prohibition
against attorney advertising is necessary because these
advertisements may encourage litigation. 75 The Court reasoned
that society has long accepted and relied on litigation as a means of
resolving disputes and enforcing rights. 76 The Court also stated
that public access to the courts is an attribute of our legal system,
rather than an evil.7 7 Thus, the state's interference with truthful
advertising was not justified on the assumption that the
advertisement may generate lawsuits. 78
The Court in Zauderer was not persuaded by the State's
argument that it needed a prophylactic rule prohibiting legal advice
supervising widespread mailings, the State failed to show that the regulation was the least restrictive
means available to control unsupervised mailings. 455 U.S. at 206. The Court reasoned that, by
requiring attorneys to file copies of their advertisements with the Advisory Committee, the state
could supervise such announcements. Id.
73. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). The Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that the Dalkon Shield advertisement was
entirely truthful. Id. at 2276. Therefore, the state could not justify banning the advertisement
because it was "inherently misleading." See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (the state may
prohibit misleading advertising). The burden was then placed on the State to prove that prohibiting
attorneys from using advertisements to solicit potential clients advances a substantial state interest.
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980). For a discussion of this aspect of the Central Hudson test, see supra notes 27-29
and accompanying text. The State indicated that the interests that justified the restriction of personal
solicitation in Ohralik also justified the restriction in Zauderer. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277. The Court,
however, noted that the state interests in Ohralik, including protecting clients from overreaching,
undue influence, fraud, and invasion of privacy, were unique to in-person solicitation and did not
justify blanket restrictions on all attorney advertisements. Id. For a discussion of Ohralik, see supra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
74. 105 S. Ct. at 2277. In-person solicitation presents the possibilities of fraud, overreaching,
invasion of privacy, and undue influence. Id. In addition, personal solicitation is difficult to supervise
because it is not open to public scrutiny. Id.; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466
(1978). The possibility of attorney misconduct is minimized when printed advertisements are used.
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
75. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
76. Id. at 2278. The Court stated that "we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a
person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." Id. (quoting Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977)). If the state is concerned with meritless litigation against innocent
defendants, it can solve its problem by imposing sanctions against "vexatious litigation." Bates, 433
U.S. at 375 n.31.
77. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2278. The Court noted that the state does not have the right to
interfere with free access to the courts by completely prohibiting advertising. Id. Thus, the Court
reasoned that an attorney cannot be disciplined for his or her advertisements merely because they
encourage litigation. Id.
78. Id.
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in attorney advertising. 79 The State had argued that a prophylactic
rule was necessary because of the difficulties in distinguishing
between truthful and deceptive attorney advertisements. 80 The
Court stated that the alleged impracticability of sorting truthful
advertisements from those that are deceptive did not justify the
total prohibition of legal advice in advertisements. 81 The Court
followed recent commercial speech cases which have emphasized
that the free flow of information is valuable enough to justify the
costs of separating the truthful from the false, and the helpful from
the misleading.82
The Court in Zauderer proceeded to analyze whether the state
could completely prohibit the use of illustrations in advertisements
by attorneys.83 After stating that the Dalkon Shield illustration was
not misleading, 84 the Court applied the Central Hudson test to
determine the constitutionality of the regulation.8 5 Pursuant to the
Central Hudson test, the state must prove that the regulation is the
least restrictive means of achieving a substantial governmental
interest. 86 The State argued that the prohibition of illustrations in
attorney advertisements was justified because illustrations present
unacceptable risks of misleading, manipulating, or confusing the
public.8 7 The Court again emphasized that the free flow of
79. Id. A prophylactic rule is one applied to an entire class of cases, regardless of whether the evil
sought to be prevented is shown to exist in a particular case. See id. The State argued that although
Zauderer's advertisements may have been harmless, a prophylactic rule restricting all attorney
advertising was needed to prevent misleading advertisements. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2279.
82. Id.; see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (regulation of nondeceptive commercial
speech must be narrowly drawn to serve substantial state interest); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (same). Zauderer's advertisement
informed readers of their legal rights. 105 S. Ct. at 2280. The Court believed the informational
benefits of Zauderer's advertisement outweighed the costs of sorting out potentially deceptive
information. Id. The Court pointed out that, if it accepted the State's argument, there would be
nothing to prevent states from banning other forms of advertising simply because of the inherent
difficulties in distinguishing between truthful and deceptive information. Id. Such a broad rule, the
Court reasoned, would give too little meaning to the guarantees of the first amendment. Id.
83. 105 S. Ct. at 2280. The Court noted that illustrations get the reader's attention and also
communicate important information. Id. Therefore, they are entitled to first amendment protection
and any restriction on them must survive the Central Hudson test. Id. For a discussion of Central
Hudson, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
84. 105 S. Ct. at 2280. The illustration was an "accurate representation" of the Dalkon Shield.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The text of Ohio disciplinary rule 2-101(B) suggests that the purpose of the prohibition
on illustrations is to make sure attorneys advertise in a "dignified manner." Id. For the text of Ohio
disciplinary rule 2-101(B), see supra note 10. The Court noted that, while the state has an interest in
maintaining the dignity of attorneys, the interest is not substantial enough to restrict an attorney's
right to free speech. Id. The Court has stated that the mere possibility that some people find
advertising offensive does not justify suppressing speech. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 687, 701 (1977)).
87. 105 S. Ct. at 2280. The State failed to show what specific evils, if any, were associated with
illustrations. Id. at 2281. The Court stated that illustrations in attorney advertisements are less likely
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information justified the costs incurred by the state in separating
deceptive illustrations from truthful illustrations.88
The Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Court's determination
that the reference to contingent fees in Zauderer's advertisement
was deceptive. 89 The advertisement stated Zauderer's willingness
to represent clients on a contingent fee basis but failed to state that
the client may have to pay certain expenses even if the lawsuit is
unsuccessful. 90 The advertisement failed to distinguish between
"legal fees" and "costs," and thus the Court determined that the
advertisement could result in unexpected expenses for the average
person, who may not appreciate the distinctions between these
terms.91 The Court reasoned that, because these technical terms
could easily mislead the public, states may require that
advertisements mention the client's liability for costs. 92
The Zauderer decision increases the bounds within which
attorneys may ethically advertise their services. Zauderer indicates
that the courts will permit attorneys to use illustrations and legal
advice in newspapers and direct mail advertisements if the
advertisements are not misleading. 93 States must bear the cost of
separating truthful advertisements from those that are
misleading.9 4 The Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed its prior
decisions in which it held that in-person solicitations are
unacceptable because the danger of undue influence is too great. 95
North Dakota is currently amending its Code of Professional
Responsibility, and it appears that the amendments will focus on
to mislead than are illustrations in other types of advertisements because the public does not
determine what attorney to contact solely by looking at an illustration. See id.
88. Id. The Court reasoned that convenience does not justify an infringement upon an
individual's first amendment rights. Id. Illustrations can be supervised by the state to determine if
they are deceptive. Id. Thus, a blanket ban on illustrations was not the least restrictive means by
which the state could protect the public. See id.
89. See id. at 2283.
90. Id. at 2281. The Court found that the advertisement gave the client a false belief that she
would not lose anything by litigating a claim. Id. at 2283.
91. Id. The Court noted that it was probable that these terms would mislead the public. Id. The
court observed that in their ordinary usage, the terms "fees" and "costs" are used interchangeably.
Id.
92. Id. The Court recognized that disclosure requirements are less of an infringement on an
advertiser's rights than are complete prohibitions on speech. Id. at 2281; see Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (state may not completely suppress
information when narrower restrictions are available); see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 374, 384
(1976) (warning or disclaimer may be required in advertisement to assure that customer is not
mislead). The Court noted that unreasonable disclosure requirements may chill commercial speech.
105 S. Ct. at 2282. But reasonable disclosure requirements will advance the state's interest in
protecting the public. Id.
93. 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
94. Id. at 2281.
95. Id. at 2277. Prophylactic rules against personal solicitation are justified because of the state's
substantial interest in protecting consumers. See id. For a brief explanation of a prophylactic rule, see
supra note 79.
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allowing greater latitude in attorney advertisements.9 6 Disciplinary
rule 2-101(B) of the North Dakota Code of Professional
Responsibility presently restricts attorney advertisements to
twenty-five categories of information.97 In light of the United States
96. Interview with Barry Vickrey, member of the Professional Conduct Subcommittee of the
Attorney Standards Committee of the North Dakota Supreme Court (Sept. 10, 1985).
97. NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)(1986). Disciplinary
rule 2-101(B) of the North Dakota Code of Professional Responsibility allows the following
information to be included in an attorney's print, radio, or television advertisements:
(I) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates;
addresses and telephone numbers.
(2) A description of the practice of the lawyer or law firm, but only as follows:
(a) A statement that the lawyer or law firm practices in one or more fields of
law, or limits practice to one or more fields of law, or concentrates
practice in one or more fields of law, if the statement complies with DR
2-101(A);
(b) If authorized under DR 2-105, a statement that the lawyer or law firm
specializes in a particular field or fields of law practice;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place ofadmission to the bar ofstate and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees, and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching position;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
(11) Memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the statement
discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, if the statement discloses that the specific fee
within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the particular matter
to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate
of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, if the statement discloses that the total fee charged will depend
upon the number of hours that must be devoted to the particular matter to be handled
for each client and that the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate of the fee
likely to be charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting
forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not be
misunderstood or be deceptive, if the statement discloses that the quoted fee will be
available only to clients whose matters fall into the categories described and that the
client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be charged,
in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee
information.
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Supreme Court's holding in Zauderer, the restrictions of disciplinary
rule 2-101(B) probably violate the first amendment.
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